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Abstract
In this paper we study the effects of policies of financial repression on long
term growth and try to explain why optimizing governments might want to repress
the financial sector. We also explain why inflation may be negatively related to
growth, even though it does not affect growth directly. We argue that the main
reason why governments repress the financial sector is that this sector is the source
of "easy" resources for the public budget. The source of revenue stemming from this
intervention is modeled through the inflation tax. Our model has the implication
.that financial development reduces money demand. Hence, if the government allows
for financial development the inflation tax base, and the chance to collect seigniorage,
is reduced. To the extent that the financial sector increases the efficiency of the
allocation of savings to productive investment, the choice of the degree of financial
development will have real effects on the saving and investment rate and on the
growth rate of the economy.
We show that in countries where tax evasion is large the government will
· optimally choose to repress the financial sector in order to increase seigniorage
taxation. This policy will then reduce the efficiency of the financial sector, increase
the costs of intermediation, reduce the amount of investment and reduce the steady
state rate of growth of the economy. Financial repression will therefore be associated
with high tax evasion, low growth and high inflation.
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This paper explores some reasons behind the existence of financial repression
and their economic consequences.

It is widely recognized that financial markets and

financial intermediation are important determinants of the economic performance of a
nation.1 Many governments in history, however, have introduced a whole host of
laws, regulations, taxes, restrictions and controls on the behavior of financial
intermediaries together with restrictions on the development and introduction of new
financial instruments and markets.
Before the 1970s, many economists favored policies of financial repression on
several grounds.

First, it was argued that. the government needed to impose

anti-usury laws thereby intervening in the free determination of interest rates.
Second, strict control and regulation of the banking system was said to give the
monetary authorities a better control over the money supply.

Third, it was thought

that governments knew better than markets and private banks what the optimal
allocation of savings was or what kind of investments were more or less desirable
from a social perspective.

Fourth, financial repression was identified with interest

rates below market rates, which reduced the costs of servicing government debts.
Some of the recent growth literature deals with the theoretical links between
financial intermediation and growth along two lines:2 first, it analyzes how financial
intermediation affects economic growth; second, it studies how economic growth might
itself affect the evolution and growth of financial intermediation.

Some of the papers

exploring the first link study the effects of policies of repression of the financial
system (in the form of taxes, restrictions and regulations of various sorts) on the rate
1For example, the 1989 issue of the World Bank's World Development Report
was entirely devoted to the role of financial markets and intermediation for the
process of economic growth.
2See Greenwood and Jovanovic (1991), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Levine
(1990a, 1990b), De Gregorio (1991), and Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989).
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of economic growth.

The main implication of these papers is that policies of

repression of the financial sector lead to a reduction in the rate of growth of the
economy.
From the empirical side, there is a large body of evidence showing that
financial repression leads to low growth rates. a The question is the following: if both
theory and evidence suggest that financial repression policies have adverse effects on
growth, why do some governments choose to follow such policies?.

This is one of

the key issues that will be addressed in this paper.
The second (and related) question we ask in this paper is why inflation seems
to be negatively correlated with growth in a cross-section of countries.

A number of

recent empirical studies use the Summers and Heston (1988) data set to show that
countries that have higher inflation rates seem to grow less after a number of other
variables are held constant (see, for instance, DeGregorio (1991), Fisher (1991) and
Roubini and Sala-i-Marti n (1991)).

Some economists have interpreted this

correlation as evidence that inflation is bad for the economic performance of a
country.

We argue in this paper that this negative partial correlation is likely to be

spurious as both high inflation and low economic growth are caused by policies of
financial repression.
It is our view is that the main reason why governments stay in the way of
private financial evolution is that the financial sector is the potential source of
"easy" resources for the public budget.
policies of financial repression.

Governments have the power to. follow

By this we mean that they have the option and

capability of not allowing the financial sector to operate at its full potential by
introducing all kinds of regulations, laws, and other non-market restrictions to the
behavior of banks and other general financial intermediaries.

The source of public

asee Fry (1988), World Bank (1988), Gelb (1989), King and Levine (1992),
Levine (1991), DeGregorio (1991), and Roubini and Sala-i-Marti n (1991, 1992).
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income stemming from this intervention will be modeled through inflation tax. 4 Our
model, as most models of money demand, will have the implication that more
financial development (which can be interpreted as a reduction in the transaction
costs of converting non-liquid to liquid assets) reduces the need for people to carry
money.

Hence, when governments allow the financial system to develop, the base for

the inflation tax is reduced and, as a consequence, so are the chances to collect
seigniorage.

To the extent that the financial sector increases the efficiency of the

allocation of savings to productive investment projects, financial repression will also
have real effects, as the amount of physical capital accumulation is smaller for every
level of private savings.

Thus, financial repression is bad for growth.

We incorporate the possibility of tax evasion by assuming that the effective
income tax rate is different from the official rate and that the elasticity of reported
income with respect to actual income is less than one.

The degree of tax evasion

differs across countries and it depends on the availability of tax-evasion technologies
(possibly due to differing efficiencies in collecting income taxes) and on prevailing
attitudes with respect to the reporting of private income.
Imagine that the government, through regulation and other non-market
interventions, can control the degree of financial development (this is what we call
financial repression).

Given the rate of money growth, the income tax rate and the

degree of tax evasion, the choice of financial repression implies two different effects:
on the one hand, it reduces income and therefore decreases the income-tax base.

On

the. other hand, it increases real money demand and therefore raises the inflation tax
base. We show that in countries where changes in actual income do not lead to

4Clearly this is not the only source of income the government
repressing the financial sector. Mandatory purchases of government
market interest rates are other important sources of public income.
of the reserve requirement plays an important role but we think of
the overall inflation tax or seigniorage (see Brock (1989)).

gets from
debt and below
The regulation
it as a part of
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large changes in reported income {ie, where tax evasion is large) the government will
choose to repress the financial sector in order to expand money demand and increase
the tax rate on money.
Summarizing, in order to increase the revenue from money creation,
governments subject to large income-tax evasion choose to increase seigniorage by
repressing the financial sector and increasing inflation rates.

This policy will tend to

reduce the amount of services the financial sector provides to the whole economy.
Given the amount of savings in the economy, aggregate investment and therefore the
aggregate growth rate will be lower.

This introduces a spurious negative correlation

between inflation and growth in the sense that a third variable (repression) affects
both inflation and growth.
It is important to note that our results are robust to the criticism that only
final output should be taxed.

Even though we model money as entering in the

utility function, we think of money as an intermediate input that makes life easier
because it saves people trips to the bank (much like refrigerators save people trips to
the supermarket).

Kimbrough {1986) and Faig {1986) show that if money is an

intermediate input, then the inflation tax should be zero because it is optimal not to
tax inputs in an economy where all final outputs can be taxed.

The reason why our

results are robust to this criticism is that they apply when there is tax evasion.
That is, when it is not possible to tax all final output, it will be optimal to tax
some of the inputs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.

In section 2 we present a simple

growth model of inflation and growth that is an extension of Sidrauski {1967) to the
linear technology of Rebelo {1991).

We show that, if variation in technologies and

money supply rules are independent across countries, this simple model predicts a
negative correlation between inflation and growth, even though inflation does not
have direct effects on growth.

In section 3, we expand the model and incorporate
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tax evasion, inflation and financial repression.

We use the model to show the effects

of financial repression on growth and argue that optimizing government might find it
advantageous to repress the financial sector in order to collect revenue.

Some

concluding remarks follow in the last section.

1. A simple model of inflation and growth.
In this section we want to analyze the relation between the inflation rate and
economic growth.

We start with a simple version of the Sidrauski (1967) model

where, in order to get positive long run growth rates, the technology is modified
along the lines suggested by Rebelo (1991).

That is the production function takes

the form

y(t)

(1.1)

=

A-k(t)

where y(t) is per capita output at time t, k(t) is the capital-labor ratio, and A is
the constant marginal productivity of capital.

We assume that the economy is

populated by infinitely lived consumers or dynasties who derive utility from the only
consumption good -

c-

and from the stock of real money per person -

m.

Households are therefore assumed to maximize a utility function of the form

(I)

(1.2)

u0 =

J

e-ptN(t)u(c(t),m(t))dt

0

where p is the personal discount rate, N(t) is the total amount of people alive at
time t, which is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate n, m(t)=M(t)/N(t)P(t), and
P(t) is the price level.

In order to bound utility we also assume p>n.

-6-

The conventional interpretation of money in the utility function is that money
"makes life easier" since it allows people to get consumption goods without having to
go to the bank and transform bonds into consumption goods all the time.

Following

Feenstra (1986), we could redefine consumption and introduce money and transaction
costs explicitly in the budget constraint rather than in the utility function without
changing the basic results.

We further assume that the utility function is time

separable and logarithmic 5 in c and m, that is

(1.3)

u( c,m) = (1-,B)ln(c(t)) + ,8.ln(m(t))

The budget constraint requires that per capita investment and real money
accumulation to be equal to per-capita savings (non consumed resources).

Savings,

in turn, equal output (Ak) plus transfers (v) minus consumption (c), minus the
erosion of real balances via the inflation tax and population growth (m•(n+m)) and
minus the erosion of per-capita physical capital by population growth:

(1.4)

.
k

+

.
m = Ak - c + v - nk - (n+:r)m

where v is the per capita transfer of money from the government and :r is the
inflation rate.

Individuals maximize (1.2) subject to (1.3) and (1.4), given the initial

stocks of nominal money and real capital.

The set of first order conditions are well

SA slightly more general utility function would be {[c(t)

where u>>O.

(l-/J)

p (1-u)

m(t) ]

-1}/(l-u)

Our functional form is the particular case of this one when u=l. Our simplifying
assumption of u=l is of no substantial importance since the effects of changes in u
on savings and growth rates are well known. See for instance Blanchard and Fischer
(1989).
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known (see Appendix A).

The optimal demand for money is

c(t) P

{1.5)

(1-P)R(t)

=

where R=A+:r is the nominal interest rate.

Note that firms' profit maximization

implies that the real interest rate, r, is equal to the marginal productivity of capital,

A.
From {1.5) we see that real money demand is a positive function of
consumption and a negative function of the opportunity cost of holding it, the
nominal interest rate.

Unlike the Baumol-Tobin "square-root" money demand

function, this one does not imply increasing returns to monetary services. In other
words, it does not imply that a doubling of consumption needs is associated with less
than double the amount of monetary services.

The Euler equation implies a growth

rate of consumption equal to

{1.6)

c(t)/c(t) - 1c

=A

- p.

Since {1.6) is true all the time, consumption always grows at the steady state rate so
it displays no transition in real time.

We assume a very simple form of government:

it prints money at a constant rate µ and transfers it to private agents in a
lump-sum fashion, v.
revenue source.

{1.7)

Accordingly, seigniorage taxes are the only governments

Thus, the public budget constraint is:

mµ

=V

It can be shown that the nominal interest rate is constant at all points in time.
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The money demand equation implies that consumption and real money balances grow
at the same rate all the time.

Thus, there is no transition for either m or c. The

transversality condition ensures that the following policy functions hold for all t:

(1.8a)

m(t)

(1.8b)

c(t)

= (p-n)

=

p-n

k(t)
•k(t)

(1-P) · (A+µ-n)

(see Appendix A for a derivation of this result).

Hence, there is no transition for

the capital stock and the level of output either so all the variables of this model
grow at the constant steady state growth rate all the time:

(1.9)

7m

=

?'c

=

7k

=

A - p > 0 for all t.

Note from {1.8b) that if the rate of growth of money µ increases, m falls for every
level of k.

In other words, if we plot ln(m(t)) over time, we get that if there is a

discrete increase in the rate of nominal money growth µ, the upward sloping line
(with slope A-p) 'jumps' discretely in the level of m(t ), but keeps the same slope.

It is in this sense that µ has real effects. The reason is that an increase in µ
implies an immediate increase in the rates of inflation and nominal interest; this
increase in the opportunity cost of holding money leads to a fall in m (relative to c
and k).

Utility levels of course fall also since money enters in the utility function.

There are several key implications arising from this model.

First, while the

rate of growth of money has welfare effects, it does not directly affect the rate of
growth of real variables of the economy.

Second, from the definition of real money
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balances and the equilibrium growth rate of real money, we find that the the
equilibrium rate of inflation is

,. = µ -

(1.10)

n - (A-p)

for all t

The larger the productivity parameter, A, the larger the growth rate of real money
demand and, therefore, the smaller the inflation rate.
A implies high consumption growth.

The intuition is simple: high

Because people demand more real money the

larger c, higher rates of consumption growth are associated with higher rates of
growth of real money.

Given the rate of nominal money growth, in order to get

high real money growth, it must be the case that prices do not grow as much.
That is, ,,. is low.

Thus, cross country variation in A implies a negative correlation

between inflation and growth.

Cross country variation in rates of money growth, µ,

on the other hand, implies no correlation between inflation and growth since µ affects
,,. but not the growth rate.

Hence, if there is independent cross-country variation in

µ and A, the correlation between inflation and growth will be negative, even though

nominal money growth has no direct effect on real growth.
Two final caveats on this model.

First, if the government cares about the

utility of the representative agent the model predicts that governments will set µ so
as to get a negative inflation rate.

That is, the Friedman Optimum Quantity of

Money rule of zero nominal interest rates applies (so ,,.

= -r).

In the real world we

see countries with high inflation rates for long periods of time (see Dornbusch and
Fischer (1991) for evidence on a number of countries with ,,. around 30% for many
years).

Our simple model does not explain this phenomenon.

This is the objective

of the model in the next section.
Second, the negative correlation between inflation and growth arises only if the
cross-country variations in 7 and µ are independent.

This assumption is unrealistic,
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especially if A is interpreted in a broad sense so as to include taxes and other forms
of government intervention. To the extent that both parameters contribute to public
revenue, they will be related through the public budget constraint. In the next
section we consider a model with explicit distortionary taxes on income, tax evasion
and financial repression.

2. Seigniorage, tax evasion and financial development.
In this section we want to formalize the links between financial repression, tax
evasion, inflation and growth.

As in the previous section, we assume that the

economy is populated by infinitely lived consumers or dynasties who derive utility
from the only consumption good and from per capita real money stock (1.2).
marginal utility of money is decreasing in financial development.

The

That is, "the• more

automatic teller machines (the more financially developed the economy) the lower the
marginal benefit of holding money".

We think of this assumption as reflecting the

negative effect of financial development on the transaction costs (costs of transforming
bonds into money).

The utility function takes the form

[I)

(2.1)

U

= J e-{p-n)t[ln(c(t)) + P(F)-ln(m(t))]

dt

0

where F reflects the level of financial sophistication, P'(F)<O and P"(F)>O.

Notice

that the assumed utility has the property that the marginal utility of money is a
decreasing function of F. 6 The government imposes a proportional income tax at a
constant rate r.

We want to allow for the possibility of cross-country differences in

BThis specification also implies that the level of utility of money is decreasing in
F. As it will be apparent later on, what matters for our results is that F affects
the marginal utility of money.
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the degree of tax evasion:

countries have different attitudes towards paying taxes

due to preference factors ( a history of public waste and inefficient provision of public
services will lead private agents to be less willing to pay taxes) and technological
factors (different governments will have different access to technologies for tax
collection that detect tax evaders; and, as argued by Stigler (1970), governments may
want to prosecute evaders to different degrees across countries).

We therefore assume

that reported income, RY, is a positive function of actual income, Y, and a negative
function of the tax rate, r (the larger the tax rates, the larger the incentives to·
evade taxes):

(2.2)

RY=h(Y,r)

with 0~hy~l and h,,. <0, and where RY is reported income and Y is actual income.
The existence of tax evasion would be represented by DRY/ oY being less than one
(changes in actual income lead to less than proportional changes in reported income)
and maybe, but not necessarily, DRY/ or being small (changes in tax rates lead to
small changes in reported income).

(2.2)'

RY(t)

-

One functional form we will use is

aY(t)/r(t) 1-(,

0< r

< 1

where ( and a are parameters between zero and one that relate to the available
technology for avoiding taxes.

Governments with poor technologies for collecting

taxes get low reported income per unit of actual income (reflected in low values of

a) and a lower elasticity of reported with respect to actual income (reflected in (
and a).

Large ( and a correspond to efficient legal systems that impose large

penalties on tax evaders (efficient police and tax collection departments, etc.) which
leads people to report most of their income (note that if a=l and (=1, we have that
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all income is reported, RY=Y, and all increases in income are reported also,
fJRY/ fJY=l).7
tax rate is

r,

It should also be observed that (2.2)' implies that, while the official
the effective one paid by private agents is

ar',

which we assume is

less than r. s
As in section 1, aggregate production takes the following linear form

(2.3)

Although the assumption of linear technology is crucial to get closed form solutions
and non-zero steady state growth, it is not essential to our story.

We could have

7While we are assuming, for simplicity, that the tax evasion technology is given,
it is clear that governments can change such a technology through investments in
resources such as higher expenditures on tracking tax evasion and reforms of the
taxation system.
SWhile it is assumed that r should be less than unity, in most countries the
highest feasible tax rate is less than one. In fact, suppose that there are two types
of agents in an economy. One group cannot tax evade (for example, labor income
earners whose taxes are retained at the source as in most countries); the other can .
evade (for example, self-employed people, earners of financial income and
entrepreneurs). Then, even if the second group evades taxes, the government may
not be able (and/or willing) to choose very high tax rates because of its inability to
distinguish between the two groups of agents. In this case, formal tax rates above
unity are infeasible but, more importantly, the actual formal maximum tax rate is
likely to be well below unity given the negative labor supply effects of high tax rates
on the non-evasion group.
This is also the reason why the government cannot compensate higher degrees
of tax evasion (lower a's) simply by increasing formal tax rates so as to reach its
target effective tax rates. In spite of the fact that in this model tax evasion does
not represent a real resource cost, in reality, tax evasion does not represent a tax
veil that can be undone by formal higher tax rates. In fact, as tax evasion
increases, the constraint of the maximum formal tax rate (unity or less) will become
binding at some point, constrain the behavior of governments and force them to
switch to other forms of taxation (such as financial repression and high inflation).
This point will be clear at the end of this section when we turn to the formal
optimal taxation analysis.
Alternatively, one could model tax evasion as implying a direct real resource
cost so that output available for consumption and investment is reduced because of
the resources wasted in tax evasion efforts induced by higher tax rates. In this case,
the results of the model will be qualitatively the same but repression of the financial
sector will be optimal for any given level of tax evasion. For more on this, see the
discussion below on optimal taxation.

- 13 -

decreasing returns to capital, in which case the steady growth rate would be zero,
just as in the neoclassical growth model.

Since we interpret K in a broad sense, the

transition to the steady state would take a long time.

Hence, we may want to think

of the present model as describing an economy characterized by "long transitions
towards steady states".
As in McKinnon (1973) we define as "financial repression" as the set of
policies, laws, regulations, taxes, distortions, qualitative and quantitative restrictions
and controls imposed by governments which do not allow financial intermediaries to
operate at their full technological potential. 9 We will imagine that the efficiency

with which savings are allocated to investment purposes depends on the degree of
financial development in the economy: the more developed (or the less repressed) the
financial sector the more efficiently savings will be allocated to investment projects.
A more developed and less repressed financial sector increases the microeconomic
efficiency of the whole macroeconomy for a number of reasons:
to the efficient allocation of the capital stock to its best use.

First, it contributes
Second, it helps to

collect and screen information (in a world of imperfect or costly information,
individuals may not know who wants to borrow or lend).

Third, an inefficient or

repressed financial sector will be characterized by high costs of financial
intermediation caused by several factors.

In repressed financial sectors, competition is

limited and oligopolistic conditions will lead to high costs of intermediation;
moreover, the more limited variety of financial instruments and markets. for financial
intermediation (such as the lack of equity and bonds markets and the inefficiency of
commercial banks) will also raise intermediation costs.

Fourth, if financial

9While economic theory suggests that a certain degree of regulation of financial
markets might be optimal in the presence of uncertainty, market failures, moral
hazard and adverse selection issues, the concept of financial repression, as defined by
McKinnon, can be interpreted as those interventionist policies that are not aimed at
dealing with the above externalities but rather have the direct and indirect objectives
of providing revenue for the government.
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intermediation is nonexistent or very costly, private entrepreneurs will be forced to
self finance their investment projects.

This may lead them to undertake projects

that are smaller (and therefore less efficient) than ones they would undertake
otherwise undertake.

An additional problem is that such agents may also have to

self accumulate nominal assets, whose real value gets subsequently eroded by high
inflation rates.
From a macroeconomic point of view, all this means that economies more
financially developed (or less repressed) are able to transform a given amount of
savings into more efficiency units of physical capital. Since, in our model, there is
only one type of aggregate physical capital, we will think of a better financial system
as generating more units of physical capital for every level of savings:

we assume

that, while a dollar of savings can be accumulated into a dollar of money balances
without any leakage, the fraction of a dollar of savings that will be intermediated
into real capital accumulation will be an increasing function of F, the degree of
development (and efficiency) of the financial sector.10 Formally this can be described
as:

1
.
- - K/N

(2.4)

VJ(F)

+

.
M/PN

=Y

- T - C

+

V

where T are total income tax payments per person and where VJ(F) < 1 for F < F*
and p(F)

=

1 for F

= F * where F * is

.
the highest level of financial development

given by the current available technology (as it is described, for instance, by
10An alternative way to introduce financial repression in the model (see Roubini
and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for an example) is to assume that investment is always
equal to savings (I = SJ but that financial development directly affects the average
productivity of capital in the linear production function, i.e. Y = VJ(F) with VJ'(F) >
0. The growth effects and the normative results of the model are identical under
this alternative specification (see the working paper version of this paper for such an
alternative specification and results).
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Greenwood and Jovanovic (1991). This budget constraint says that the after-tax per
capita savings (non consumed resources) are equal to per capita investment net of
the resources used in the financial intermediation process, plus money accumulation.
Defining lower case variables as the real per capita versions of their upper case
counterparts, (2.4) can then be rewritten as:

(2.4')

+1(F) (y - t - c + v) - n z -

z -

where z = k + +1(F) m.

i-

+1(F)m

The maximization of utility (2.1) subject to the constraint

(2.4) yields a money demand function of the form (see Appendix B)

(2.5)

md(t) = ,B(F)c(t)/R(t)

where R(t) is the nominal interest rate at time t, R(t)= (l-ar()A+1(F) +i-(t) and
(l-ar( )A+1(F) is the real post-tax interest rate.

That is, real money demand is a

positive function of consumption and a negative function of the opportunity cost of
holding it, the nominal interest rate.

Notice also that money demand is a negative

function of the level of financial development of the economy (F) for all levels of
nominal interest rates.

This reflects the idea of financial development lowers the

transaction cost of transforming non-liquid into liquid assets.

The interest rate

elasticity of money is equal to 1 and, in particular, it is independent of F.

This

result comes from the assumed constant intertemporal elasticity utility function.

The
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Euler equations imply that the rate of consumption growth equal to

(2.6)

There are several aspects of (2.6) that need to be highlighted.

First, as long as

F and r are constant, consumption grows always at the same constant rate all the
time.

Second, consumption growth is independent of nominal variables.

another form of Sidrauski's result:

This is

changes in the rate of growth of money do not

affect the steady state growth rate of consumption.

Yet this does not mean that

money is "superneutral" because changes in the rate of money creation will have an
effect on the desired stock of real money.

As its name indicates, real money is a

real variable that reflects the provision of monetary services which, in our setup,
affect utility.11 Third, the growth rate is a positive function of the degree of
financial development, F, and a negative function of the tax rate, r.
we use a simple graph to illustrate this point.

In Figure one

The line called RC (which stands for

Return to Consumption) is the Euler equation for private consumers and can be read
as the return to savings (r) has to equal the return to consumption (p+7), which is
an upward sloping function in the r-7 space.
after tax marginal product of capital:

The return to investment (RI) is the

r=f(F*)A(l- ar().

In the absence of financial

repression, the growth rate is determined by the crossing point.

Policies of financial

repression, however, introduce a wedge between the two schedules.
is consequently lower:

The· growth rate
an F lower than the technologically feasible F * leads to an

decrease in the real post-tax return to savings (f(F)A(l-ar ()<f(F*)A( l-ar()), and a
consequent decrease in investment and growth rates.
To close the model we need to specify the behavior of the government.

In

111n a setup with an explicit shopping technology, money and inflation would
affect consumption as well due to the role of transaction costs.
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order to focus on the distortions induced by financial repression and non lump-sum
taxation, we assume that the government can neither borrow nor lend.

This

assumption is reasonable if we think of governments that have limited access to
international borrowing and enjoy little confidence from private domestic savers,
possibly because the existing levels of debt are so extremely high that private agents
in the economy believe that there is a large incentive for the government to default
on its debt obligations.

Under these conditions, the government will have to do

without any domestic or international borrowing.

(2.7)

V

- M/NP

+

The public constraint is

T

Because the economy will end up growing at positive rates, we need to make
some assumption on the scale of the government.

If, following Sidrauski, we were to

set the size of the transfers to some constant, the size of the government would be
negligible asymptotically as the economy grows.12 We therefore assume that the size
of the government sector relative to the economy is constant or that transfers are
proportional to the stock of capital: 13

(2.8)

where

E

V(t) - EK(t)

will be the policy parameter that tells how large the government sector is

relative to the economy.

As we mentioned above, the tax revenue is based on

12Following Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) we could allow for
productive public spending. Altenatively, we could introduce government spending on
goods and services in the utility function. The implications of such extensions are
well known and we leave them as an exercise to the reader.
t3Since y = A k, this is the same as transfers being proportional to output or
consumption.
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income taxes, with constant average and marginal tax rate r so

(2.9)

Finally, we assume that the government sets the nominal growth rate of money
at a constant level µ so

(2.10)

M(t)/M(t)

=µ

The resulting budget constraint in per capita terms is the following

(2.11)

The implied social budget constraint is

(2.12)

k

+

n k

=

f'(F) (Ak - c)

or

(2.12')

I

= f'(F) · S

where I represents gross investment and (Ak - c) are savings.

In words, a given

level of savings transforms into a larger or a smaller level of capital accumulation
depending on the level of financial development f'(F).

Another way to think about

(2.12) is that the increase in the capital labor ratio is equal to savings (total output
per capita minus private consumption) net of the resources lost in the financial
intermediation process.

This is what we meant by the financial sector increasing the
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efficiency of the allocation of savings into investment.
The transversality condition requires that capital grow at the same rate as
consumption at all points in time.

The policy function for consumption is

(2.14)

(see Appendix B).

An interesting point is that a higher tax rate r reduces the

growth rate 7c but it increases the level of consumption c(t) given the capital stock.
In fact, an increase in r has an income and a substitution effect.

The substitution

effect implies that higher tax rates lead to a lower return to savings, to a lower
quantity of savings and higher consumption).

The income effect leads to a decrease

in the rate of growth of the economy and, therefore, a decrease in permanent income
and consumption.
increases.

Given k(O), the substitution effect here dominates so c(O)

The adverse effect on growth leads to an ambiguity in the effect of r on

welfare.
Similarly, an increase in the degree of financial development F will increase
/

consumption: first, higher F leads to an increase in the rate of growth of the
economy and therefore a permanent increase in income and consumption (income
effect);

second, an increase in F represents an increase in the return to savings, and

should induce a fall in consumption (substitution effect).

As long as 11 is different

from zero, the income effect dominates the substitution effect and an in~rease in F
leads to an increase in consumption (in the case when 11=0, that is, no effective
income taxes, the two effects exactly cancel out and consumption remains
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unchanged).

The equilibrium inflation rate and nominal interest rate are, respectively

(2.15a)

(2.15b)

R(t)

=p

- n

+

µ

which are constant at all points in time (see Appendix B).
decreasing in F and increasing in r.
both r and F:

The inflation rate is

The nominal interest rate is independent of

On one hand, a higher r (or a lower F) reduce the real interest

rate; on the other hand a higher r (or a lower F) increases the equilibrium rate of
inflation.

For the log utility form that we considered, the two effects exactly offset.

Using (2.14), the policy function for m(t) is:

m(t)

(2.16)

=

P(F) p-n+,(F)Aar( k(t)
p-n+µ

note that there is a negative relation between µ and m(t) given k(t) through the
inflation rate, and a positive relation between F and m(t), and r and m(t) since
both F and r tend to affect c(t) positively (which leads people to demand more
money for transactions).

Real money balances always grow at the same rate as

consumption and capital.

As shown above, this growth rate is always constant.

Using (2.16), the government budget constraint can be rewritten as

(2 .17)

f

= µ

P(F)

p-n+,(F)Aar( + ar(A.
p-n+µ

where, recall,

f

is the size of the government relative to the stock of capital.

Public

revenue per unit of capital is the sum of seigniorage and income tax collections. It
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is assumed that the government can control the rate of money growth µ,, the tax
rate ,,. and (through policies of financial repression) the level of development of the
financial system, F.

The derivatives of revenue with respect to these three

arguments are analyzed below:

Revenue and loney Growth.

(2 .18a)

Money growth has two offsetting effects on revenue: first, it increases the
seigniorage tax rate which increases total seigniorage; second, it increases the
equilibrium rate of inflation and the nominal interest rate which reduces the inflation
tax base, m(t).

Since nominal money growth does not affect the level or the growth

rate of per capita income, it does not affect income tax collection.

Under our

particular specification, the economy is always on the left hand side of the inflation
"Laffer curve" so higher nominal money growth goes along higher seigniorage.

Revenue and Financial Repression.

The effect of financial repression on public revenue is given by:

(2.18b)

fh./DF = _µ,_ {Aa,,-( [p P' +Pp'] + (p-n)

p-n+µ

P'}.

More financial development (high F) affects real money demand and therefore
the inflation tax base. It does so through four different channels.

First, it lowers

the per capita demand for money at given nominal interest rates.

This tends to
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reduce seigniorage.

Second, it increases real interest rates and, consequently,

increases the first component of the nominal interest rate which further reduces
money demand.

Third, it increases the growth rate of the economy which reduces

the steady state inflation rate.

This tends to reduce the demand for real balances.

Unless the utility function is almost linear, the first and second effects clearly
dominate the third effect so the per capita stock of real money is a decreasing
function of the level of financial development.

In our particular case of logarithmic

utility, the second and third terms exactly offset so financial development does not
affect nominal interest rates.
µ• p-n+lfJ(F)Aar<.13, {F),
p-n+µ

The sum of these first three effects on seigniorage,

is unambiguously negative.

The fourth effect is that larger

F increases desired initial consumption and therefore, money demand.
the tax base for seigniorage.

This increases

This term, µ• /3(F) • ar'-A· 1/J' {F) is positive.
µ+p-n

The net effect is therefore ambiguous but depends on the degree of tax evasion

a. In fact, for a=O, a change in F does not affect consumption and the second term
is equal to zero. In this case, the above derivative is certainly negative and financial
development leads to a net reduction of revenues.

This means that governments

which face a lot of tax evasion will certainly find that their total revenue rises when
they repress the financial sector.
becomes more important.

As a becomes larger, the second term in {2.18b)

In fact, as A is larger the substitution effect of a change

in F on consumption is smaller {since any increase in the real return to savings
generated by a higher F leads to a lower post-tax return to savings when tax
evasion is low, i.e.

a

is high).

Hence, the likelihood of oE/IJF being positive is an

increasing function of a.
In summary, financial development decreases real money demand and therefore
the inflation tax base.

Thus, the total net effect of an increase in financial

development on the government revenues is negative in the presence of high levels of
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tax evasion.

Conversely, in such an environment :financial repression increases both

seigniorage and government revenues.

Revenue and Distortionary Taxes.

Finally, the effect of an increase in the tax rate r on tax revenues is given by

(2.18c)

8E/ {Jr

=

/J(F)

µ
(µ+p-n)

,(F)Aa(r(-l

+

(ar(-lA > 0

An increase in the tax rate has two positive effects on total revenue.

First,

higher income tax rates directly lead to higher total revenue (this is the second term
in (2.18c)).

Second, it reduces the return to investment so people increase short-run

consumption and their demand for money.

This increases the base for the inflation

tax (this is the first term in (2.18c)).
The above results suggest that countries where it is relatively easy to evade
income taxes (low a and ()

will be countries where the elasticity of public revenue

with respect to income tax rates is small and the elasticity of public revenue with
respect to the level of financial development is high.

Such governments will find it

easier to raise revenue by repressing the financial sector (lower F) and printing
money (higher µ) than by levying taxes (higher r).

Optimizing Covernment and Yelfare.

From an optimal taxation point of view, the crucial question is whether
optimizing governments will actually choose to distort their economies.

To answer

this question, we need to specify some objective function for the government.

For
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instance, governments might not like to print money, but they may have some

-

(exogenous) target rate of growth of money, µ,.

Alternatively, we could assume a

loss function for the government such as those used in the tax smoothing and
optimal seigniorage literature {Barro {1979), Mankiw {1987)): for example,
governments dislike high inflation and high tax rates, but like greater financial
development.

It is easy to show that if a government has such a preference function

and a budget constraint like {2.17), such a government will choose positive rates of
inflation, financial repression and tax rates. In other words, the government will find
optimal to repress the financial sector even if this leads to lower long-run growth.
The key question is whether a benevolent government which cares about the
utility of the representative agent will also find it optimal to financially repress its
economy.

Formally, if the government maximizes the

u0

in (2.1) subject to the

policy functions ct=~{kt) and mt=~{kt) and subject to kt=k0e7t and the government
budget constraint, is it still possible to make a case for the desirability of financial
repression?

By substituting the policy functions derived above into {2.1), we obtain

the following reduced form utility function:

(2.19)

u0

=

_:_{(1+P)ln([p-n+f(F)Aar()]-Pln(p-n+µ)+Pln{P)+
p-n

+ (1+P)ln ko + (1+P)(1-ar()f(F)A-p}
p-n
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with the following partial derivatives:

au0;aµ

(2.20a)

(2.20b)

au0/aF

=

-P(F)

P'{F) { ln [k0

=

p-n

+_1_
p-n

<o

(p-n) (p-n+µ)
(p-n)] + A,p-p + 1 + ln[P(p-n+µ)]} +
p-n

Aip'-p
[{l+P) _
_ ]
p-n

Note that the second term in {2.20b) is unambiguously positive and the first term is
negative.

We assume that the parameters are such that the overall effect is positive

which means that the overall effect of financial development on people's utility is
positive.14

(2.20c)

auo/ar

=

a(r(-l A tp
~
(p-n) (p-n+ar ipA)

(1+P)

- (1+P) 2 a•A·ip(r(-1
(p-n)

<0

The first-order conditions for the optimizing government are

where the partial derivatives are written in {2.18) and {2.20) respectively and where

14If we this result did not hold, we would have the finding that the government
would always financially repress the economy since that increases people's utility and,
furthermore increases public revenue. This result, however, would not be too
interesting.
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A is a Lagrange multiplier.

taxation.

Conditions (2.21) are the Ramsey Rule of optimal

These three equations together with the government budget constraint

specify optimal values of r *, F *, and µ* given the parameters a, (,

E,

etc. It should

be noted that the government would not just want to maximize the growth rate 7
because agents care also about the levels of ct and mt: in particular, low tax rates
induce higher growth rates but they also lead to an increase in savings, and a fall in
both the level of current consumption and in the level of money demand.
This very complicated system of nonlinear equations can be solved numerically.
Numerical simulations suggest that if

'{J"

is sufficiently small there is an interior

solution where the government chooses a level of F that is lower than the maximum,
i.e. the government chooses to repress the financial sector.

The simulations suggest

that when tax evasion is large (small a and (), optimal F is small and optimal µ is
large.

More specifically, for high values of a and ( (low tax evasion) it is optimal

not to repress the financial sector (so that F will be chosen by the government as
equal to its maximum level).

In this case, most of the revenues of the government

will be income taxes plus a small amount of seigniorage derived from the fact that
the optimal inflation rate is positive even when the financial sector is not repressed.
For values of a and ( below a certain critical value, even higher statutory tax
rates will not deliver enough revenue to pay for government spending.

At this

critical value of a, the formal tax rate will be set to its maximum feasible level but
the total revenue from income taxes will not cover all government spending.

At this

point, reducing the degree of financial development will start to be optimal since it
increases both money demand and seigniorage revenues.

For values of a below the

critical value, the revenues from income taxes will fall even further (since the
statutory rate is already set at its maximum level) so that it will be optimal to
further increase the degree of financial repression and, at the same time, choose high
levels of the inflation rate in order to increase the seigniorage component of
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revenues.1 5, 16
The model therefore implies that the greater the level of tax evasion, the less
the government will derive its revenues from income taxes and the more will. it
choose to repress the financial sector so as to induce large money balances and,
consequently, a large inflation tax base.
tax money at high µ (notice that, as

a

It is then optimal for the government to
is smaller the growth losses of low F are

offset by lower effective tax rates so the effect on growth is ambiguous).

Since the

elasticity of revenue with respect to income taxes is small because people evade such
taxes, it pays the government to lower F because the loss in actual revenue is
relatively small.
As an extreme case, consider a country whose level of tax evasion is so large
15It is clear that the reason why zero repression of the financial sector is optimal
for a range of values of the level of tax evasion is that, in this model, tax evasion
does not lead to a real resource cost. If we make the alternative assumption that
such a real resource cost occurs (as resources are wasted in tax evasion efforts caused
by higher tax rates), we would always get an interior solution where a certain
amount of financial repression is optimal for any degree of tax evasion. This
alternative specification would require assuming that output net of resources wasted
in tax evasion (Y*) is a negative function of tax rates (since higher tax rates lead to
higher tax evasion efforts) or: Y*= (1 - O(r)) Y where O'(r) > 0.
16The result that the optimal inflation rate is positive even when there is zero
repression of the financial sector, rather than being equal to Friedman's rule as set
out in section 2, depends on two assumptions of the model: first, income taxes are
distorionary; second, money is equivalent to a final good since it enters in the utility
function. In models where money is an intermediate good, such as Kimbrough
(1986), Faig (1986), the optimal inflation rate is zero since it is optimal to tax final
goods only. Our result about the optimality of a positive inflation rate would,
however, hold even if we had considered a model where money was an intermediate
good rather than a money in the utility function model. The reason is that, as tax
evasion increases, the formal tax rate reaches its maximum and taxes on final goods
(or income) are not enough to cover government spending. In this case, the
government will be forced to resort to its only other source of revenue, inflation and
seigniorage taxes. In other words, when the maximum formal and effective tax rate
is reached, further taxation of final goods or income become impossible and the
government will have to tax the intermediate good, i.e. money. Moreover, in the
presence of tax evasion and illegal economic activities that are cash-intensive,
taxation of money balances is optimal even if money is an intermediate input. In
fact, if the tax evading sector is cash intensive, the only (and optimal) way to tax
its final output is to tax the monetary balances used in the transactions in this
sector.
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that the government has lost control over its ability to generate revenue from income
taxes.

This corresponds to the case where a=O.

Condition (2.21) can be rewritten

as

(2.21)'

By using the partial derivatives in (2.18) and (2.20) and setting a=O, we note
that the first term in (2.21)' represents a negative relation between F and µ.

The

second term in (2.21)' represents a positive relation between F and µ if t1" is
sufficiently small.

The crossing point gives an F 0 and a µ0 that represents the

optimal level of financial development and the optimal rate of money growth 11 ( see
figure 2).

Obviously, as a gets higher, the government start using some income

taxes to finance its revenues and for sufficiently large a's (economies with little tax
evasion) we already showed that the government will choose not to repress the
financial sector since that yields no positive revenue yet it still entails losses in
utility.
The results that we have obtained can be summarized as follows.

In order to

increase the revenue from money creation, governments_ of countries with inefficient
tax systems (high tax evasion) may optimally choose to increase per capita real
money demand by repressing the financial sector.

As a side effect, this policy will

tend to reduce the amount of services the financial sector provides to the whole
economy and a given level of savings will be intermediated in a lower level of
investment.

This will reduce the steady-state rate of growth of the economy.

In the absence of direct data on tax evasion and the size of the underground
economy, our story has the following empirical implications:

17lf

t?'' is sufficiently small, the solution will be interior.

countries with high tax
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evasion are countries with large financial repression, high monetary growth and high
inflation rates.

As a consequence of the real effects of the distortions in the financial

sector, these economies will have lower (pre-tax) real interest rates, higher base
money per capita and lower per capita growth. In Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1991,
1992) we found evidence in favor of the implications of the model.

In particular we

found that, after controlling for other determinants of economic growth, measures of
financial repression (such as negative real interest rates, high required reserves ratios,
measures of distortions in capital and financial markets and high inflation rates)
negatively affect growth rates in cross-country regressions such as those estimated by
Barro (1991).

In particular, all these proxies for financial repression entered

negatively and significantly affected the growth rates in the estimated equation for
growth.

3. Concluding Remarks.
In this paper, we build a model of financial repression, tax evasion, inflation
and growth that allows us to examine the effects of policies of financial repression on
long-term growth.

We are able to explain why optimizing governments might want

to repress the financial sector.

Our view is that the main reason why governments

repress the financial sector is that this sector is the potential source of "easy"
resources for the public budget, here modeled as seigniorage revenues.
The main results of the paper are the following:

First, because policies of

financial repression tend to reduce the amount of services the financial sector provides
to the whole economy and, therefore, to reduce aggregate investment for given levels
of savings, financial repression will have adverse effects on long-run growth.

Second,

in order to increase the revenue from money creation, governments of countries with
inefficient tax systems (high tax evasion) may optimally choose to increase per capita
real money demand by repressing the financial sector and choose high rates of money
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growth.

Third, as a result, high financial repression will be associated with high

monetary growth, high inflation rates, high seigniorage and low economic growth.
This will tend to generate a spurious negative correlation between inflation and
growth.
evidence.

These implications seem to conform well with the the existing empirical
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Appendix A:

The Non-Transition of the Simple Model

The first order conditions are:
e--(p-n)\1-/J)/c = ~
e--(p-n)t/J/m = ~(A+:r)

-~ = ~

(A - n)

lim ~(t)(m(t)+k(t)) = 0
t->m
Plugging the government budget constraint (1. 7) into the private budget
constraint (1.4), we get the social budget constraint

(A.l)

k=Ak-c-n k

If we integrate (A. l) between O and T, we get

Use the transversality condition to get

(A.3)

lim e--(A-n)tkt=O and lim e--(A-n)tmt=O.
T->m
T->m
Using (A.2) in (A.3):

(A.4)

1im [k -c /(p-n)] + 1im c /(p-n)e--(p-n)T =
T->m 0 0
T->m 0

o.

For the first term to go to zero, it must be the case that it is zero all the time (it
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is independent of T).

Hence

{A.5)

For the second term to go to zero, we must impose p>n (which we assumed in order
to get bounded utility).

Rewrite kt as

{A.6)

{A.6) implies that also kt grows at the steady state rate all the time so that there
is no transition to the steady state for k either.

Finally, lim e-{A-n)tmt is always
T->w

zero if p>n since the first term falls at {A-n) and the policy functions are

{A.7)

(A.8)

for all t.

for all t.

- 36 -

Appendix B: The Non-Transition of the Second Model.
The first order conditions are the following
-(p-n)t
e
/c(t) = .\(t) p(F)
-(p-n)t
e
P(F)/m(t) = .\(t)R(t) p(F)
.\(p(F)(l-a r()A-n) = -,\
lim .\(t)[k(t)+m(t)]=O
t->m
We can divide both sides of the budget social constraint (2.12) by k and integrate
between O and t to get

(B.l)

k(t)

= [ k0-

cO
(p(F) · A-n)t
---- ] e
Ap-n-7 c

cO

+ ---- e

7ct

Ap-n-7 c

where 7c is constant and given by (2.6). If we integrate the third first order
-[(1-ar()p(F)A-n]t
condition we also get that .\(t)=.\ e
, where ,\ is the dynamic
0
multiplier.

The transversality condition says lim .\(t)[m(t)+k(t)]=O. Using (B.1)
t-im

and the same argument used in appendix A this implies the following policy function

(B.2)

and we need to require p>n (which we assumed at the outset in order to get
bounded utility).

Plugging (B.2) in (B.l), we get that kt grows at the same rate as

consumption at all points in time.
no transitional dynamics.
function.

Thus, we are always in steady state and there is

Note that (B.2) is a closed form solution for the policy

It applies at all times ct = [p-n+p(F )Aai]kt given that c and k grow at
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the same rate all the time.
We can also derive the equilibrium inflation rate and nominal interest rate.
Starting form the definition of the nominal interest rate we get:

(B.3)

R(t)=

r(t)+:r(t) = f(F)A(l-ar() + (µ-n-7m) =
= µ+p-n+7R = R

which implies:

(B.4)

.
R

=

2
R - (µ+p-n)R

This is a differential equation in R that is unstable at R=µ+p-n and stable at R=O.
But R=O is not feasible wit µ > 0.

Thus, the only solution to this differential

equation is R = p+µ-n at all points in time. Hence, R is constant, 7R=O and
7m=7c at all points in time.
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